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First, I would like to thank Mike Thicke (2011) for his very perceptive and
civil review of Science: The Art of Living. He himself alludes to the difficulty
that reviewers have had with my previous books defending intelligent design
as a necessary condition for the possibility of science, a point I have discussed
in this journal (Fuller 2008b). Fuller (2010) has no less polarised reviewers. Here
readers are invited to contrast the rather sophisticated critical review of Science
that has already appeared in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Fagan 2011) and
the bigoted one in arterly Review of Biology (Malaterre 2011), which ascribes
to me views I make a point of denying. Both reviews appeared in high-profile
venues in their respective fields and both were wrien by younger people trained
in both philosophy and biology. I am happy to let future historians sort this one
out.
Thicke rightly observes that I support “historical counterfactualism” as a mode
of philosophical insight. I plan to bring together my thinking on this method soon,
although a short account of my orientation has already appeared (Fuller 2008a)
that refers to work that goes back to Social Epistemology. But my commitment
to historical counterfactualism goes back even further—and certainly predates my
involvement with the intelligent design controversy. It is already present in my
doctoral dissertation (Fuller 1985), which was strongly influenced by Jon Elster’s
(1979, 1983) secular re-framing of theodicy (i.e. how can this be the best possible
world when it seems so bad?) through the then-hot Kripke-Lewis debates over
the interpretation of “possible worlds.” Even now I do not believe that the field in
which my PhD was awarded, “history and philosophy of science” (HPS), makes
much sense unless that phrase is meant in the strong conjunctive sense of “and”
that supports historical counterfactuals. Metaphysically speaking, a strong HPS
perspective presupposes that modal claims can be cashed out temporally. Indeed,
I am inclined to the Hegelian view that philosophy is about the ultimate causal
structure of history.
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Thus, when T. H. Huxley claimed that had Darwin preceded Newton, science
would never have reached the levels it had in the late Victorian era, he
meant that Darwin’s resolutely earthbound orientation to human beings would
have inhibited modern science’s universalist aspirations. Universalism demands
the sort of pretence to a divine standpoint that Newton’s Unitarian brand of
Christianity allowed him to exploit so well. Huxley’s judgement was a historically
revealed observation about a conceptual requirement of science that had been
previously obscured because it had never been challenged. Aer all, however
extreme Newton’s theological views may have been, most people adhered to an
unreflective version of the biblical idea that we are created “in the image and
likeness of God.” But Huxley rightly imagined that were Darwin’s diminished
view of humanity to colonise popular culture, then people might start to question
the wisdom of a science that presumes our species could comprehend, let alone
dominate, all of nature. Of course, some people might still wish to continue
pursuing Newton-style science, but it would no longer have the same cultural
significance. It would become more like a hobby or even a cult, rather than the
epistemic standard by which all other forms of knowledge are judged.
In short, Darwinism does not provide the conceptual resources for a
robust universalist defence of science. If the scientific life led Newton to
self-mystification, as is oen claimed, it led Darwin to self-demystification. At this
point, I want to pick up Thicke’s complaint that I exaggerate Darwin’s intellectual
distance from Mendel, based simply on his failure to cut the pages of the book
that Mendel sent him. In fact, I believe that their intellectual proximity has
been long exaggerated to provide a coherent Whig-historical backstory for the
Neo-Darwinian synthesis. (A similar comment might be made of Durkheim and
Weber—neither having taken much interest in the other—vis-à-vis the received
history of sociology.) My view is that, even had he cut the pages, Darwin would
have been put off by the “self-mystifying’”character of Mendel’s science: that
is, the mathematical exactitude of his approach to heredity that was born of a
view of God as a superchemist who combined elements in different proportions
to produce organisms. While this view suggests the confident spirit of today’s
biotechnologists, Darwin would have seen in the Moravian monk’s numerology
evidence of wishful thinking (cf. Bowler 1989).
That the scientific establishment has so far failed to see Darwin’s demystifying
implications is revealed in its bewilderment as to why Darwin-style appeals to
innate animal curiosity fall flat as an adequate justification for public support of
science: Such appeals fail to distinguish the self-serving fancies of an elite from
the sort of disciplined, intergenerational commitment required of science. What I
call “Protscience” is a set of contemporary aempts—modelled on the Protestant
Reformation—to rescue science (cf. Christianity) from this decadent state by
demanding a tighter integration between the pursuit of science and the realization
of human potential. Science is compelling not because we trust the word of
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experts but because it is the signature form of human empowerment. However,
as the history of Protestantism warns, it remains a very open question whether
this democratic sensibility ends up generating so much epistemic diversity as to
undermine science’s conceptual coherence.
Thicke does not like that I include climate change sceptics and intelligent
design (ID) proponents with AIDS activists as “Protscientists” because only the last
have had “productive” relationships with scientists. In the case of ID proponents,
the charge is very telling because their basic epistemic assumptions and general
approach to scientific inference are prey much the ones that propelled the first
two hundred years of the Scientific Revolution. So, in that respect, ID has had
an exceptionally productive intellectual relationship with science. However, the
cultural politics surrounding Darwin’s reception over the past 150 years have
effectively instilled a strong prejudice against ID in the scientific establishment,
which has been exacerbated in the US by an intellectually perverse reading of the
constitutional separation of church and state.
My point here is that the scientific establishment and the wider culture share
only partially overlapping prejudices. The inclusion of the AIDS activists’ claims
demand a much smaller change to science’s overall self-understanding than the
claims of climate sceptics or ID proponents. Indeed, the success of AIDS activists
is only the thin end of the much wider wedge of Protscience that faces greater
resistance from scientists, especially as Protscientists insist on incorporating a
meta-level understanding—of the sort HPS encourages—that puts the current
consensus of scientific opinion in historical perspective. For example, if our best
computer models now say that we have fiy years to save the planet, yet those
models tend to undergo a sea change every twenty-five years, then do not the
climate change sceptics have a point? Sometimes people say that the Protscientists
“misuse” or “distort” HPS, but all they are doing is taking commonplaces in our
field as grounds for redressing the burden of proof in public science policy debates.
Finally, let me comment on the lack of references in the text, which has
bothered people in ways I find somewhat puzzling. First, Fuller (2010) is a 166-page
book, 20 of which comprise a bibliographic essay on the main intellectual sources
for my argument. While this format is common to the “Art of Living” series, it
was also a feature of the best selling of my books, Kuhn vs. Popper, where it did
not seem to cause such problems. To a large extent, I believe that the complaint
reflects prima facie intellectual resistance to Science’s argument, though perhaps
such resistance was mitigated in the case of Kuhn vs. Popper by its having been
preceded by a large scholarly work (Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for
Our Times) that covered much of the same ground. However, at a more general
level, in our thoroughly “informatised” world, I do wonder about the wisdom
of including references that go beyond establishing maers of fact not readily
available elsewhere (e.g. original archival material). The ideal that a text should
be self-sufficient in accounting for all its sources appears increasingly outmoded,
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when any name, concept or title can be easily accessed on the internet. Academics
would do beer to resist the temptation to turn their texts into paper search
engines and put more effort into developing critical judgements about the main
sources that frame their own arguments. In short, we need more bibliographic
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